Three years ago I wrote an Editorial -The Avoidance ofScandalfor this Journal (Med. Sci. Law 31(4». In this, I gave a brief outline of a number of historical and contemporary instances where socially, psychologically and physically disadvantaged individuals had been the subject of either wilful mistreatment, neglect or lack of effective care and understanding. Since then, there have been a number of other incidents to add to this sad list: for example, the reports into child care services in Leicestershire (Kirkwood, 1993) , into complaints at Ashworth Hospital (Blom Cooper et al., 1992) , into the death of Orville Blackwood at Broadmoor (Prins et al., 1993) and, finally, into the activities of nurse Beverley Allitt (Clothier et al., 1994) .
Hard on the heels of these inquiries has followed the report by Ritchie et al. (1994) into the care and treatment of Christopher Clunis. This inquiry showed neglect and poor practice of another kind, namely failures to communicate between those who might have helped to avert the tragedy that occurred. Clunis, a diagnosed schizophrenic, stabbed to death the recently married Jonathan Zito on a London Underground platform. Following Clunis's trial, conviction and disposal by way of a Hospital Order with restriction, the two relevant Health Authorities (North-East and South-East Thames) set up an independent inquiry consisting of Janet Ritchie QC (Chairwoman), Dr Donald Dick (Psychiatrist) and Mr Richard Lingham (formerly a Director of Social Services). Their most detailed and careful report, which traces the care (or rather lack of it) of Christopher Clunis for the period 1986-92, makes very sober and disquieting reading. None of the agencies involved escape criticism -police, CPS, Health and Social Services, the Probation Service and the voluntary sector. The inquiry team report a 'catalogue of failure and missed opportunities'. To be fair, they also identify a few instances of dogged care and concern on the part of one or two workers. The inquiry team carried out the daunting task of piecing together Clunis's history. As they say: 'It was like receiving bits of a jigsaw puzzle in random order and trying to find the next piece of the jigsaw so as to allow us to form the picture'. Overall, there emerges not a picture of wilful or intentional neglect of duty, but a failure to spot vital behavioural cues and clues and a failure to communicate between agencies at every level. Had information from a variety of sources been linked, certain deficiencies observed by the inquiry team would have been obviated. Some examples are: (i) Failure to obtain a detailed and sequential history ofthe pattern ofClunis's life-style. (ii) Failure to consider his past record of violence and to treat it seriously enough to proceed with prosecution rather than diversion; his case is a good example of diversion being espoused uncritically (see my article in the April 1994 issue ofthis journal). (c) Failure to act assertively enough in dealing with the steady deterioration of his condition. This failure arose because of an erroneous ideological assumption about not wishing to label a patient so as to avoid stigmatizing him.
(d) Failure to monitor his progress in a proactive fashion. Coupled with all these deficiencies were important gaps in resources (namely beds in Regional Secure Units in the London Inner-City Area, beds in general psychiatric wards in the same area, lack of non-hospital-based accommodation for the recovering severely mentally ill and an insufficiency of Mental Health Act Approved (section 12) doctors and appropriately trained and experienced social workers.
Finally, the team (with a great deal of courage) identifies two trends that for far too long have failed to be addressed: (i) the overlooking or minimizing of violent incidents, and (ii) the postponement of decisions or action when difficulty is encountered because a patient is threatening or intimidating and possibly because he is 'big and black'.
The team makes 70 recommendations. I will mention a few of the more important.
• The need for the care planning approach to be linked effectively with the provisions of section 117 of the Mental Health Act (those pertaining to after-care); • The need for care planning across boundaries and the implementation of Supervised Discharge Orders (likely to be brought before Parliament this year); • Linked with the above, they recognise the need for special provisions to keep track of the small number of hard-to-track and hardto-trace relapsing, schizophrenic patients;
• They recommend better training of social workers in mental health work, and the same for the police service; • More involvement of GPs;
• They suggest further guidance should be issued on the implementation of Home Office Circular 66/90 concerning the diversion of mentally disordered persons who offend from the criminal justice system; • They advocate the use of members of the public as volunteers and befrienders of severely mentally ill persons like Clunis who are in receipt of section 117 after-care.
Taken as a whole, the Report could be a landmark in the history of the treatment of a small group of difficult-to-manage, severely mentally ill people -some of whom are also offenders. The Department of Health has certainly begun to address this problem in a variety of ways, but the vital question of resources remains. However, this is only one aspect of the problem. Even if funding and resources are available, the problems of interdisciplinary understanding and communication still remain to be tackled. Institutions such as this Academy and centres for the promotion of inter-disciplinary socioand forensic psychiatric studies could (and should) all play an important part in this arena. Failure to grasp these issues and initiatives will, as the inquiry team indicates, result in further tragedies.
